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The Japanese economy is in the midst of a major merger and acquisition (M&A) wave for the 
first time in the postwar period. This paper puts a spotlight on Japan’s M&A activity, which has 
surged since the end of 1999, and takes a look at the factors that have contributed to the surge, and 
its various economic dimensions. The paper places Japan’s M&As in an international context, and 
identify the causes of the wave and its structural characteristics (sections 2 and 3). It also examines 
the economic role of M&A and its pros and cons. We contend that M&As contribute to raising the 
efficiency of resource allocation and organizations (sections 4 and 5). The last section addresses 
policy implications and contains concluding remarks. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The Japanese economy is experiencing a major merger and acquisition (M&A) wave for the 
first time in the postwar era. It is well-known that the former zaibatsu groups, which had been 
dissolved in the occupation period, were reformed through M&As in the 1950s. And during the 
period of capital liberalization which began in the late 1960s, horizontal mergers in the steel 
and automobile industries in response to the rising threat of takeovers by foreign firms 
generated considerable attention. However, from the high-growth era of the 1960s to the 
mid-1990s there were, on average, only two to three M&A transactions between publicly listed 
firms annually, and the volume of M&A activity never reached a wave-like level. 
It is also true that hostile takeovers, such as the famous case of the acquisition of 
Shirokiya, attracted public attention at the beginning of the high-growth era, when the stock 
ownership structure of Japanese firms was highly dispersed, and their capital composition was 
vulnerable as a result of various postwar reforms. However, as shareholding stabilized from the 
mid-1960s, hostile takeovers mostly receded into the background, though occasional takeovers 
by shady entities were attempted. As Kester (1991) and others have emphasized, the main 
features of the Japanese corporate system, such as long-term employment, the main bank 
system, and cross-shareholding had been impediments to M&A deals. M&As did not play a 
prominent role in driving Japanese economic development, reaping synergies, and disciplining 
management through the mid-1990s. 
In a departure from the previous trend, however, from the late 1990s, M&A activity, 
centered on transactions between domestic corporations, has surged. Acquisitions of domestic 
firms by foreign corporations have also had a role to play in this surge. The total number of 
M&A deals annually has steadily increased from 1999, reaching a record of 2,674 deals in 
2006, a nearly five-fold increase from a decade earlier. 
This paper seeks to present an overview of the factors that have contributed to the rapid 
surge in M&A activity in recent years, and of the economic role of M&As by drawing on the 
existing literature and the results of my own research. The spike in M&As has recently 
attracted considerable public attention. While the increase in the number of deals has been 
favorably received for playing a key role in the rejuvenation and growth of Japanese   3
corporations, M&As have been criticized for amounting to nothing more than vehicles used to 
rescue ailing firms, or to transfer wealth between stakeholders, and hostile takeovers have been 
condemned for creating impediments for those who wish to manage firms for the long term, 
and for generating profits solely for securities houses and law firms that structure these deals. 
Moreover, the large-scale horizontal mergers that have occurred in recent years have raised 
major concerns regarding conformity with the Anti-Monopoly Law. In addition, there has been 
a wide-ranging debate on the pros and cons of takeover defenses, and on strategies for 
responding to the lifting of the prohibition on triangular mergers in May 2007, which is 
expected to promote acquisitions of Japanese firms by foreign corporations.   
However, there has been very little empirical research on the causes of the surge in M&A 
transactions, and their economic function, which could serve to inform these policy debates. 
This survey seeks to set forth some basic information to help settle the following points of 
controversy raised by the current M&A wave. 
The first part of this paper tries to provide answers to the following questions: 
•  Why did the volume of M&A deals suddenly increase at the end of the 1990s? 
•  What is the connection between long-term employment, the main bank system, 
cross-shareholding, and other institutional features of the traditional Japanese 
company system, and the M&A wave? 
•  What are the special characteristics of Japan’s M&A wave when placed in an 
international context? 
In order to answer these questions, this paper highlights the drivers of the M&A wave, and 
attempts to place the features of Japanese M&A transactions in an international context, drawing 
on the findings of Jackson and Miyajima (2007). This paper emphasizes that the recent M&A 
wave in Japan not only shares commonalities with the global M&A wave, which has been 
triggered by technological innovations that have expanded growth opportunities, and 
deregulatory measures, but also has been characterized by factors unique to Japan including 
economic shocks such as excess plant capacity and reforms to the legal infrastructure for 
corporate consolidation. Unlike in the other four countries in this study, stock market conditions 
have only had a limited effect on the M&A wave in Japan. It should also be stressed that Japan’s 
M&A market has been characterized by the prevalence of integrations, acquisitions, and capital   4
participations by holding companies, and a strong tendency to preserve the independence of 
target firms. Though there is a growing tendency to view M&As as a contest by managers to 
drive up the values of corporations, there is still a preference for mutual consensual transactions 
between the concerned parties, and the Japanese M&A market still remains markedly different 
from the U.S. and British M&A markets, which are characterized by arm’s-length transactions, 
and the preference for mergers (and integration of separate corporate legal entities). As for the 
relationship between the evolution of the Japanese corporate system since the mid-1990s, and 
M&As, it needs to be emphasized that the M&A wave has been facilitated not only by the 
dissolution of the traditional Japanese corporate system but also by the evolution of the 
Japanese corporation toward a hybrid model that has imparted unique features on the M&A 
activity in Japan. 
The latter part of the paper highlights the economic role of M&As  by asking the 
following questions: 
•  Does M&A activity enhance the value of corporations? And does the nationality of 
the acquiring firm (domestic or foreign) lead to differences in synergy effects? If so, 
what are the reasons for this? 
•  Does the increase in activist funds impose appropriate discipline on the management 
of target firms? Or, are would-be acquirers nothing more than green mailers who 
force managers to implement policies, which drive up the price of a stock in the short 
run so that it can be sold for profit? 
•  What role have M&As played in adjusting workforces in Japan? While M&A deals 
have played an important role in promoting employment adjustments, they might also 
breach the long-term trust that had developed between the target firm and its 
employees. 
In attempting to answer these questions on the economic role of M&As this paper will 
focus on both the positive and negative effects of M&A transactions, drawing on recent research 
and estimations from my own collaborative studies. The following basic findings are presented: 
the recent M&A wave has contributed to an increase in the resource allocation efficiency of the 
Japanese economy, and an increase in the organizational efficiencies of corporations; the 
negative aspects of M&As such as the over-confidence of managers, excessive valuations by the   5
stock market, and the breakdown of trust between stakeholders, have still not become manifest 
in a systematic fashion; the activities of activist funds have had a positive effect on stock prices, 
and have begun to affect the financial strategies of target firms; acquisitions by overseas 
corporations can be expected to produce a positive effect through the transfer of technology and 
know-how to the target firm. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section will place the characteristics of Japan’s 
M&A wave in international context. Section 3 addresses the features of Japan’s M&A market. 
Section 4 focuses on the economic role, both the positive and negative aspects of M&A activity. 
Section 5 will examine the long-term performance effects of M&As. The last section addresses 
policy implications and contains concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The M&A Wave in International Perspective: Are There Factors Unique to Japan? 
 
As seen in Figure 1, all five leading industrialized countries experienced M&A waves from the 
end of the 1990s. The number of M&A deals in all five countries, including Germany and 
France, which had previously experienced low levels of M&A activity, began to rise from 1998, 
peaking in 2000. During the boom (1998-2005), M&A activity accounted for a maximum of 
20.7% of GDP in Britain, 10.7% of GDP in the U.S., 9.9% of GDP in France, and 7.5% of 
GDP in Germany (Table 1). While the total value of M&A activity as a share of GDP is still 
rather small, there has been a rapid rise in the level of such activity when compared to the level 
of activity in the early 1990s. Moreover, while M&A deals began to taper off in the other four 
countries since 2002, the level of activity in Japan has steadily increased. Scholars have 
pointed to the following factors to explain the recent M&A waves.
1 
•  The emergence of excess capacity in specific sectors 
•  Technological innovation and the increase in new growth opportunities 
•  Deregulation and regional integration (e.g. economic integration of the European 
Union) 
•  Internationalization of finance (increase in institutional investors), protection of 
                                                  
1 See  Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), Martynova and Ronneboog (2005).   6
minority shareholder rights, standardization of accounting principles, and other 
economic and legal changes 
•  Booming stock market, financial reform, and other financial factors 
It is important to identify which factors in Japan’s M&A wave from the late 1990s are common 
to other countries, and which are unique to Japan. 
== Table 1 & Figure 1 about here == 
 
2.1  The Combination of Positive and Negative Economic Shocks 
The merger wave that began in many leading industrialized countries in the late 1990s centered 
on growth industries tied to technological innovation, and Japan’s merger wave was not an 
exception. The telecommunications sector accounted for the largest share of the M&A activity 
in terms of value in the U.S., Germany, France, and Britain, and accounted for the second 
largest share of such activity in Japan after the financial sector (Table 2). When measured in 
terms of numbers of deals, business services (which include advertising, placement agencies, 
programming, and security) accounted for 10.5% of M&A activity in Japan, 11.3% in Germany, 
8.7% in France, 10.5% in the U.S., and 9.8% in Britain. The business services sector was the 
most active M&A sector in four out of the five countries, with the exception of the U.S., where 
it was the second most active sector.
2 Thus, Japan’s M&A wave was centered on growth 
sectors, and shared commonalities with the other aforementioned industrialized countries. 
== Table 2 about here == 
However, Japan’s M&A wave is distinguished by the fact that transactions which aimed to 
consolidate and restructure mature industries were occurring in tandem with the strategic M&A 
implemented in the previously mentioned growth sectors. The prolonged recession of the 
1990s gave rise to excess plant capacity, indebtedness, and workforces which created the 
conditions that triggered M&A that aimed to restructure companies. In particular, M&As that 
restructured the paper, ceramics, steel, and oil refining industries were intended to reduce 
excess plant capacity. On the other hand, the corporate group restructurings that affected 
companies in the electrical machinery, retail and distribution, and other industries were an 
                                                  
2 The banking sector accounted for the largest share of M&A deals in the U.S. The account that follows is 
based on Jackson and Miyajima (2007), which draws on data from the Thomson ONE Banker database. This 
database includes all types of mergers and acquisitions (i.e. mergers, takeovers, capital participation).   7
attempt to revamp the industry portfolios of corporate groups which had expanded by 
establishing new companies from the late 1980s through the first half of the 1990s. The M&As 
that occurred in the financial sector from 1999 onward were an attempt to deal with the 
problem of excessive numbers of firms in the sector. 
In the U.S., the M&A wave of the 1980s was motivated primarily by the desire to 
restructure and reorganize companies, while the strategic M&A wave that has been going on 
since the late 1990s has been driven by technological innovation.
3 Japan’s M&A wave from 
the late 1990s is distinguished by a combination of two concurrent forces: the negative 
economic shocks that triggered corporate reorganizations similar to those seen in the U.S. in 
the 1980s, and the positive shocks of technological innovation and deregulation which have 
been felt globally since the 1990s. While the pressures from the negative economic shocks 
initially fueled Japan’s M&A wave, the positive shocks from technological innovation have 
helped to sustain the M&A wave into this decade. 
 
2.2 The Important but Relatively Limited Effect of Deregulation in Japan 
Deregulation and economic consolidation have had a major impact on the global increase in 
M&A activity. Deregulation played a particularly important role in the U.S. M&A wave that 
began in the late 1990s. The deregulation of the U.S. banking sector, which opened the door to 
interstate transactions, prompted the consolidation of regional banks, and the deregulation of 
the airlines led to the consolidation of that industry (Harford 2005). While deregulation has 
also played an important role in Japan, the extent of its effect has been relatively limited when 
compared to the other four countries. Indeed, the Big Bang in the financial sector, and the 
elimination of barriers to entry in the telecommunications sector, were key factors that 
contributed to the increase in M&A activity in the Japanese financial and telecommunications 
sectors. Although mergers of public utilities such as electricity and natural gas were important 
drivers of the M&A wave in the U.S., Britain, and France, there were fewer such deals among 
public utilities in Japan. (Table 2) 
On the other hand, regional consolidation was an important factor underlying the M&A 
                                                  
3  Mitchell and Mullerin (1996), Andrade and Stafford (2001), and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) emphasize 
this aspect.   8
wave in Europe (Martynova and Renneboog 2006). From the late 1990s, Japan implemented 
changes in its investment policy that were designed to promote direct investment, playing a 
key role in increasing cross-border M&A deals (Fukao and Amano 2004). However, 
cross-border M&A activity has been less important in Japan, particularly when compared to 
Europe, and the share of cross-border M&A activity in Japan is similar to levels in the U.S. 
According to Table 3, cross-border M&A deals accounted for 20% to 25% of all deals in 
Germany, France, and Britain, and in terms of total value of the deals as a share of GDP, M&A 
accounted for 14.9% of GDP in Britain, and nearly 6% in Germany and France. By contrast, 
although cross-border M&A activity did increase in Japan, cross-border deals involving an 
overseas firm as the acquirer accounted for only 7.9% of the total number of deals, and only 
0.3% of GDP.   
== Table 3        Cross-Border M&A about here == 
 
2.3 Improving Legal Framework for Corporate Consolidation and Accounting System 
It has been pointed out that changes to the legal infrastructure have played an important role in 
fueling the M&A wave in Europe. According to the scores for minority shareholder rights used 
by La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 2004), on a scale with the highest score being 
a 6, France increased its score from 3 to 4, and Germany from 1 to 3 in the 1990s. As Japan 
also began to implement legal reforms from 1993, its LLSV minority shareholder rights score 
rose from 4 to 5, though these reforms may not have been the determining factor.
4 According 
to Rossi and Volpin (2004), the protection of the rights of minority shareholders serves to 
promote M&A activity because it reduces the potential for carving out private benefits in the 
corporate control arena, and makes it easier to contest control rights. Therefore, while such 
protections might help to explain an increase in hostile takeovers, they do not explain why the 
M&A wave has been driven primarily by friendly takeovers. 
Instead, Japan’s M&A wave has been shaped by several factors unique to this market. 
                                                  
4 The rise in the LLSV minority shareholder rights score was due to the 1993 revision of the Commercial 
Code, which made it easier to file shareholder representative suits, and beefed up the external auditor system. 
Furthermore, the strengthening of the auditor system in 2001 and the introduction of a system for choosing 
board structure (2002) can also be interpreted as measures which bolstered protections for minority 
shareholders. However, since it became possible to issue regular shares without voting rights in 2001, the 
LLSV score decreased from 5 to 4.   9
First, the accounting system should be emphasized as a unique factor fueling the M&A wave in 
Japan. Japanese corporations often have affiliations with numerous subsidiaries belonging to 
the same corporate group, and often extend guarantees for the liabilities incurred by 
subsidiaries under their umbrella. The existence of these guarantees means that potential 
acquirers could be exposed to tremendous risks. The introduction of consolidated accounting 
and market-based accounting practices in 1999 eliminated many of the concerns regarding the 
lack of transparency surrounding the financial performance of target companies. Strict 
consolidated accounting practices made it much more difficult for corporations to manipulate 
the financial condition of the firms under their umbrella. The result was that incentives to sell 
poorly performing firms within a corporate group increased, and the supply of targets to the 
M&A market expanded (Higgins and Beckman, 2006). 
Second, the changes in the legal infrastructure for corporate consolidation also played an 
important role. As pointed out in Arikawa and Miyajima (2007), the lifting of the ban on 
holding companies and the introduction of the stock transfer system made it possible to 
establish new holding companies to preside over existing corporations, and for corporations 
under these holding companies to preserve their independence (and corporate culture) while 
enjoying the benefits of consolidation. Nippon Unipac Holding, which was the first pure 
holding company to be established in the manufacturing sector, adopted a stock transfer 
scheme which smoothed the consolidation of Daishowa Paper, which possessed its own unique 
corporate culture. The adoption of the share swap system in 1999 was also a major change. 
Acquirers could now pay for their acquisitions with stock, and could compel minority 
shareholders to transfer their shares. The introduction of this system made it possible for an 
electrical manufacturing company to restructure its corporate group by converting firms under 
its umbrella into wholly owned subsidiaries (Miyajima 2007). On the other hand, share swaps 
became an important institutional change that allowed IT-related firms with high growth 
potential but facing severe financial constraints to resort to M&A deals as a part of a growth 
strategy. 
Third, the adoption of the Law of Special Measures for Industry Revitalization and 
Rejuvenation in 1999, the Civil Rehabilitation Law, and rules clarifying how the 
Anti-Monopoly Law would be enforced, other legal revisions related to M&A activity, and the   10
implementation of the consolidated corporate tax system from 2001 were also important. The 
Civil Rehabilitation Law boosted the supply of target firms to the M&A market by enhancing 
the incentives for implementing rapid reorganizations. Moreover, the Law on Special Measures 
for Industry Revitalization and Rehabilitation and legal revisions made it possible for firms to 
receive rapid reviews with regard to whether a transaction would infringe on the 
Anti-Monopoly Law, and allowed firms to move forward more aggressively on merger and 
takeover decisions. 
One could say that the recent M&A wave would not have occurred without these various 
revisions to the legal infrastructure. However, as noted in Arikawa and Miyajima (2007), these 
legal changes were not completely exogenous. Corporations which sought to reorganize or 
grow through M&A demanded the legal reforms, and M&A activity increased as a result of the 
reforms that were adopted. 
 
2.4 Changes in the Economic System 
Apart from the above-noted changes to the legal framework, economic institutional factors 
such as changes in the ownership structure, corporate and bank relationships, 
labor-management relations, and other changes to the corporate governance structure have had 
an important effect on M&A activity. Until the mid-1990s, the scale of the M&A market in 
Germany, France, and Japan was relatively small, and only began to expand after the corporate 
governance structures in each country began to evolve. 
Germany, France, and Japan, in contrast to Britain and the U.S., had ownership structures 
characterized by a relatively high percentage of insider ownership (the total ownership share of 
managers, financial institutions and corporations with business relationships with the firm), but 
since the late 1990sthe share of ownership by insiders has declined in Japan, Germany, and 
France In 2005, the share of ownership by insiders was 33% in both the U.S. and Britain, or 
nearly at the same level as it was in 1999. By contrast, between 1999 and 2005, the insider 
ownership share fell from 69% to 60% in Germany, from 48% to 41% in France, and from 
48% to 41% in Japan (Jackson and Miyajima 2007). 
In tandem with the decline in the ownership share of transaction banks and affiliated 
corporations, there was also a rise in the ownership share of institutions, and particularly   11
foreign investors. Ever since the publication of the Avon Letter which lifted the ban on the 
exercise of voting rights by pension funds in 1988, the fiduciary responsibilities of pension 
funds, life insurance companies, and other institutional investors have increased, and 
institutional investors have attached more importance to the performance of their stock 
investments. These changes have created opportunities for growth, encouraging firms with 
extra capital to adopt aggressive M&A strategies, and firms with deteriorating profit outlooks, 
and unprofitable internal operations to adopt reorganization measures quickly. Consequently, 
the supply of potential targets for the M&A market has also increased. Furthermore, the 
decline in insider ownership (stable shareholders) has made it easier for activist funds to 
engage in M&A activities. Indeed, in Japan, activist funds have increasingly targeted firms 
with low stable shareholder ratios (Xu 2007). 
Relationships between corporations and banks have also changed. In Germany, major 
banks have begun U.S. and British style investment banking operations, and banks have begun 
to play an important role as providers of funds for hostile takeovers (Höpner and Jackson 
2001). In Japan, the unraveling of main-bank relationships, which had served as a constraint on 
M&A activity between domestic firms, has been important. In the past, main banks had taken 
the initiative in rescuing client firms undergoing financial hardship. But after the banking crisis, 
the main banks were confronted with their own financial crises, and thus were reluctant to 
undertake private workouts that forced them to assume a heavy financial burden. Instead, they 
became more aggressive in forcing firms with excess debt to sell off assets.
5 In addition, the 
consolidation of the banking sector after the banking crisis has not only made it easier to 
conduct negotiations between creditors, but also made it less likely that corporate group, or 
keiretsu, relationships would serve as an obstacle to M&A activity.
6 
Finally, changes in the employment system including the decline in the number of regular 
employees, and more flexible employment patterns in a number of corporations have also 
                                                  
5 Of course, after the banking crisis passed, additional financing from the main banks kept collapsed firms 
afloat (Arikawa and Miyajima 2006), and strong main-bank relationships (as indicated by a high degree of 
dependence on financing from the main bank) continued to serve as a hindrance to M&A activity. However, 
one could say that as the banks restored their own financial health, and as the relationship between banks and 
their corporate clients transformed into solely a contractual one, the effect of this hindrance has been reduced. 
6 For example, one of the preconditions that facilitated the JFE merger was the fact that the main banks of 
Kawasaki Steel (Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank) and NKK (Fuji Bank) respectively had already combined to form 
Mizuho Bank.   12
promoted M&A activity. Until recently, Japan’s employment practices were based on 
long-term employment and the resulting formation of company-specific skills had served as a 
constraint on both the demand and supply of M&A targets.
7 Firms with a high growth 
potential and capable of acquiring other firms preferred to grow internally rather than by 
merging with other firms with different employment and salary practices (Odagiri and Hase 
1989). On the other hand, firms with a great need to reorganize preferred to restructure on their 
own rather than enter into mergers that would require the integration of different organizations. 
However, in recent years, employee resistance to M&A has declined in acquiring firms due to 




2.5 To What Degree Have Financial Factors Promoted Mergers and Acquisitions? 
The M&A wave that began in the late 1990s has been encouraged in part by financial factors. 
In particular, the U.S. M&A wave was fueled by a stock market boom and the frequent use of 
stock swaps (Table 4). In the late 1990s, as seen in Figure 2, there were stock market booms 
not only in the U.S., but also in Germany, France, and Britain. The global M&A wave that 
began in the late 1990s paralleled the stock market boom that peaked between 1999 and 2001. 
In Japan, however, even though the IT sector experienced a steep rise in stock prices, the stock 
market as a whole has been in a slump since 1998 (unlike in the other four leading 
industrialized countries). Of the M&A deals between 1998 and 2005, the EBTIDA (earnings 
before taxes, interest, and depreciation) multiple for acquisition prices exceeded 5 in both 
Germany and France, but was an exceptionally low 1.4 in Japan, or much lower than in the 
other four leading industrialized countries (Table 4). While a shift in the acquisition prices can 
be confirmed for Japan, booming stock prices have had a relatively limited effect on the M&A 
wave. Instead, loose monetary policies, and in particular zero interest rates, and the subsequent 
easing that began in March 2001, have played an important role by ameliorating the capital 
                                                  
7 It is said that in Germany and France, where workers are organized along industry lines, the interests of 
employees had less of a constraining effect on M&A activity (Jackson and Miyajima 2007). 
8  In a 1995 survey which asked who do companies belong to, 97% of respondents replied “stakeholders.” In a 
2005 survey asking the same question 90% of respondents replied “companies belong to shareholders.” In a 
survey of company employees, around 80% replied that they would welcome an M&A if it increased the 
value of the company (Source: Ministry of Trade, Economy, and Industry, Materials, December 2006).   13
constraints on acquiring firms. Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) show that the rise in the net 
internal funds held by corporations has increased the likelihood of those corporations 
becoming acquirers. 
== Table 4 & Figure 2 about here == 
In sum, the Japanese M&A wave that dates from the end of the 1990s was triggered by 
technological innovation, a factor shared with the four other leading industrialized countries, as 
well as by the need to eliminate excess plant capacity. Consequently, the Japanese wave 
consisted of both strategic M&A deals to spur growth, and deals designed to consolidate and 
restructure operations. In addition, deregulation and liberalization, the legal infrastructure for 
corporate consolidation, and accounting standards have played a unique role in Japan. 
Furthermore, changes in the economic institutions which comprised the Japanese corporate 
system including the decline of the main bank system, and the increasing prominence of 
institutional investors also contributed to the M&A wave. On the other hand, a boom in stock 
prices has had little impact on M&A activity. From around 2000, financial factors such as the 
reduced reliance on interest-bearing liabilities, and the decrease in debt payments due to lower 
interest rates have improved the financial ability of corporations to fund M&A deals. 
 
3. The Diversity of M&A Markets 
 
Arm’s length vs. coordinated M&A markets 
Mergers and acquisitions come in various forms (mergers and takeovers) and transaction 
formats (negotiations or takeover bids), which in turn define the character of each country’s 
M&A market. What are the special characteristics of Japan’s M&A market as it has expanded 
rapidly since the end of the 1990s? 
First, of the M&A deals of listed firms among the five countries, mergers in Japan were 
less common than acquisitions (whole, and partial, i.e. involving the purchase of less than 50% 
of the target) which maintained the legal independence of the target corporation, while tie-ups 
are relatively more frequent (Table 5).
9 In the U.S. and Britain, half of M&A deals take the 
                                                  
9 In acquisitions, when the value of the target firm is 40% to 60% of the acquiring firm, equal mergers 
involving a 1-to-1 swap of stock are frequent (Hattori 2004).     14
form of mergers due to the high level of legal risk posed by conflicts of interest with minority 
shareholders, particularly in England, where there is an obligation to acquire all stock (a 
‘mandatory bid’ rule). On the other hand, there are fewer restrictions on listed firms in 
Germany, France, and Japan, and a strong desire to maintain corporate cultures helps to explain 
the preference for acquisitions that maintain the legal independence of the target firm. Some of 
the special traits of Japanese corporations, such as their dependence on efficiencies reaped 
from skill formation developed within the firm on the basis of long-term employment, and the 
strong tendency to act as a community of stakeholders, have played an important role in 
shaping M&A activity. 
== Table 5 Forms of M&A, about here == 
Second, when discussing M&A in Japan, even if we limit our focus only to the large-scale 
deals between listed firms, we find that the acquiring firm usually possessed a substantial prior 
stake in the target firm. As seen in Table 6, if the acquiring firm is German, French, or 
Japanese, it is more likely to possess a higher percentage of the shares of the target firm even 
before the merger/acquisition takes place than American or British acquirers. Of the 114 M&A 
deals between listed firms from 1990 and 2002 the acquirers held 15% or more of the shares of 
the target firms in 67 cases, or more than half of all cases. This indicates that the M&A wave 
involved more than a simple restructuring of subsidiaries within a corporate group, but rather 
took place between listed firms with preexisting capital tie-ups. 
== Table 6 Characteristics of the M&A Market about here == 
As is often emphasized, the high percentage of a corporation’s shares held by financial 
institutions and corporations with which it has business ties presents a formidable obstacle to 
hostile takeovers. However, it is important to note that given the ownership structure is 
concentrated, and the controlling shareholder decides to sell off its stock; when it is confronted 
with negative shocks such as a rapid decline in demand for its products, the emergence of a 
powerful rival, or rising costs, control rights can be easily transferred. Therefore, these factors 
can facilitate friendly takeovers. In this sense, I would like to emphasize that one of the special 
features of Japanese corporations – namely, the high percentage of shares held internally – has   15
in fact encouraged M&A transactions.
10 
  Third, most M&As in Japan are effected through private negotiations, and takeover bids 
are still infrequent. According to Table 6, which compares the M&A markets of the five 
leading industrialized countries, 50% of the M&A deals in Japan involved private negotiations 
between the acquiring firm and the shareholders of the target firm. Private negotiations were 
more frequent in Japan than in the other four countries.
11 Conversely, there were only 44 
takeover bids, accounting for 12% of the M&A deals between listed firms. Even though 
takeover bids have increased in recent years, they are still infrequent in Japan as compared to 
the other four countries. As history suggests in the takeover bids launched by Sony, Matsushita 
Electric, NEC, and other companies, most of these deals involved stock swaps that turned 
consolidated listed subsidiaries into wholly owned subsidiaries. (Table 7) 
  Moreover, there were no hostile takeovers in Japan up to the year 2000, and there have 
only been six hostile takeover bids since then, a much lower figure than in the U.S., which had 
332 hostile takeovers, and Britain, which had 176. While the massive purchases by activist 
funds have generated considerable public attention, the extent of the purchases by the activist 
funds, and the frequency of hostile takeovers are still quite limited when compared to other 
countries. In addition to being few in number, most hostile takeovers cannot be described as 
successes. 
  In light of the above features, the acquirer’s stock price premium is also smaller in 
Japan.
12 According to Table 6, the stock price premium offered for the target firm’s shares in 
Japan was lowest among the five countries. The premium (which is the difference between the 
offered price, and the market price four weeks before the unveiling of the offer) averaged 25% 
to 30% in the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany, but only 10% in Japan,
13  though it has been 
rising in recent years, and the rise in the premium should be considered as one of the important 
                                                  
10 Whether the interests of the controlling shareholder aligns with the interests of minority shareholders is a 
separate issue. 
11 The Thomson ONE Banker database defines private negotiations as “an acquisition of shares that was 
privately negotiated,” in contrast to the public tenders of takeover bids. In the case of private negotiations, the 
bidding firm already holds a stake in the target firm prior to the M&A deal. 
12 The fees charged for mediating mergers and acquisitions are lowest in Japan among the five countries. 
While this issue requires more detailed study, the lower fees should be understood in terms of the 
characteristics of the M&A market enumerated above. 
13 In an international comparison conducted by Rossi and Volpin (2004) for the years 1990 to 1999, the 
premiums in Japan were abnormally low – in fact, Japan was the only country where a negative stock price 
premium was reported.   16
changes to have occurred to Japan’s M&A market since 1999. 
  The comparison of the form of the M&A deals, and transaction format in the five 
countries reveals that the M&A market that is taking shape in Japan is different from the U.S. 
and British markets, which are characterized by arm’s-length relationships, and has more in 
common with the coordinated German and French markets. The rapid increase in the number 
of M&A deals in Japan does not mean that a market for corporate control similar to those in 
the U.S. and Britain is developing here, but rather suggests that a qualitatively different market 
that emphasizes coordination and friendly takeovers is emerging. 
 
Hybridizing Japanese Corporate System and M&A 
The above international comparison suggests that the features of the Japanese corporate 
governance structure have not served as a constraint on the adoption of M&A strategies but 
rather have helped to shape the Japanese M&A market. As noted in the previous section, the 
features of the Japanese corporate system such as long-term employment, the main bank 
system, and cross shareholding had been viewed as acting to constrain M&A activity (Kester 
1991), and it was believed that the dissolution of these features contributed to the M&A wave. 
Granted, it is possible to view the decline in the financial health of banks as leading to the 
unwinding of cross-shareholding, a deterioration of their capacity to launch rescues, and an 
increase in the proportion of shares held by institutional investors which have all played some 
role in promoting the M&A wave. The relationship between corporations and their capital 
providers has clearly moved toward more market-based arrangements. The task of evaluating 
the growth potential of corporations, once conducted largely through monitoring by banks 
which had access to private information, has now been transferred to the capital (stock and 
bond) markets, and the emergence of the M&A market can be seen as important part of this 
shift.
14  (Aoki 2007, Jackson and Miyajima 2007b) 
However, it would be an oversimplification if we were to characterize the relationship 
between the various aspects of the Japanese corporate system and the recent M&A wave as 
monotonous, and to imply that the dissolution of the traditional model induced the M&A wave. 
                                                  
14 Aoki (2007) develops the concept of external monitoring of internal linkage to explain how this business 
model (business strategy, organizational design, marketing strategy, and firm-specific compensation system) 
is combined with the human assets of employees.   17
Since the Japanese corporate governance structure is itself evolving in a hybridized direction,
15 
it is important to identify the features of the Japanese corporate system that have imparted 
special characteristics to the Japanese M&A market. 
As the Japanese corporate system has evolved toward market-based arrangements, it has 
promoted M&A through various pathways. First, main banks, which used to support the 
restructuring efforts of client firms by offering rescue packages, have spun off their 
restructuring departments and created rebuilding funds, and have sold nonperforming loans to 
them, thus sustaining the supply side of the M&A market (Yanagawa 2007). Second, the 
advantage of internal holdings is that when industrial shocks occur, the managers of the 
acquirers and target firms are in a position to arrange M&A deals through negotiation. Third, 
the features of Japan’s corporate governance structure, which is based on long-term 
employment and a strong sense of shared community, helped to promote various revisions to 
the legal infrastructure for corporate consolidation that allowed target firms to retain their 
independence. This laid the groundwork for the M&A wave centered on the establishment of 
holding companies formed to purchase shares in other corporations. In this sense, the recent 




4.  Economic  Role  of  M&A 
 
4.1 M&A and Efficiency of Resource Allocation   
Then, what economic role has the increase in M&As played in Japan since the late 1990s?  
The existing literature, which examines M&As in the U.S. since the 1980s, asserts that such 
activities have enhanced the efficiency of resource allocation.
16 M&A activity in Japan may 
have had a similar effect. 
Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) show, as the standard neo-classical model predicts, 
technological innovation and deregulation systematically increased the frequency of M&As. 
                                                  
15  See Aoki, Jackson, and Miyajima (2007) on the evolution of the Japanese corporate system in recent years. 
16  Jensen (1993), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Harford (2005), Mitchell and Stafford (2004).   18
Following Harford (2005), they estimated a model for the M&A ratio at the industry level 
(annual M&A cases in industry j / number of listed firms in industry j) that was regressed on 
both positive and negative economic shocks. They show that the M&A ratio is positively 
sensitive to growth opportunity, as well as to negative industry shocks (discontinuous sales 
decline). In addition, the analysis, based on firms’ micro data, finds that a firm with high 
growth opportunities has a higher probability of being an acquirer in M&A deals.
17 This 
implies that the M&A boom since 1999 has become an important path for allocating resources 
from mature sectors to high-growth sectors. 
On the other hand, the M&A ratio for Japanese firms, according to the analysis in 
Arikawa and Miyajima (2007b), is sensitive to negative economic shocks such as the unusual 
declines in sales or stock price changes. It also reveals that a firm with a lower Tobin’s q or 
lower TFP, or higher leverage is a more likely target of M&A deals (Arikawa and Miyajima 
2007b, Fukao et al. 2007).
18 This result implies that M&As were implemented more 
frequently in sectors characterized by excess plant capacity, excess indebtedness, and excess 
employment. Table 7 reports the performance deterioration and weight of M&A among listed 
firms in the five leading industrialized countries, and shows of the probability that a listed firm 
would become an M&A target in the event that it performed poorly. It is clear that of firms in 
the five countries, Japanese firms were most likely to become targets if they had negative ROA 
or a PBR of less than one. These results are consistent with the view that the increase in M&A 
activity since 1999 was a driver of the reorganization schemes that were needed during the 
1998 – 2002 period of structural adjustment. 
== Table 7 about here == 
It is often pointed out that M&A activity in Japan has not played an important role in 
disciplining management and promoting reorganization, in light of the fact that hostile 
takeovers have been so rare in Japan. However, according to the estimation of Arikawa and 
Miyajima (2007), and Table 7, although the M&A market in Japan is dominated by friendly 
                                                  
17  When the sample is limited to mergers, this also applies. 250 days before the merger announcement excess 
return (ER) of bidding firms (the difference between stock return of firm i and market return of TOPIX) are 
reported to be 10% in Table 10, showing that bidding firms have higher profitability. Moreover, when the 
sample is divided at 1999 when the merger cases increased, the average ER after 1999 is higher. In short, the 
increase in mergers after 1998 was driven by high stock prices. 
18  Fukao et al. (2007) documents that takeover attempts by foreign firms mostly target profitable firms.   19
takeovers and based on coordination among firms; this does not imply that M&A activity does 
not impose discipline on management. Certainly, M&As have begun to perform the monitoring 
function once performed by main banks and are starting to assume an important role in 
business reorganizations. In Japan, M&As have also functioned to encourage the elimination 
of excess capacity (Jensen 1993), Thus, M&As can serve to encourage corporate restructuring 
regardless of whether the intentions of the takeover are hostile or not. 
 
4.2. Do M&As Really Enhance Firm Value?: Cumulative Abnormal Return Analysis 
Has the increase in M&A activity actually enhanced firm value by improving organizational 
efficiency? We have attempted to answer this question by using the standard methodology for 
estimating cumulative abnormal returns (hereafter CAR). Needless to say, this approach 
assumes that the stock price response around the merger announcement exactly reflects value 
increases from economies of scale and scope, and other synergetic effects such as reduced 
indirect costs stemming from the M&A. 
As M&A activity increased rapidly, empirical research on M&A using CAR analysis 
began to appear. Recent research on M&A using CAR analysis has been tabulated in Table 8.  
Results in Miyajima et al. (2007) are also summarized in Table 9, which covers the merger 
announcements between listed firms from 1992 to December 2005. Even though the results are 
still tentative; Table 9 has the advantage of including the most recent M&A events.
19 In 
addition, to check whether or not the mergers within IT-related industries or mergers in sectors 
troubled by non-performing loans are positively related to stock price, the sample was divided 
into the IT-related sector (electronics, telecommunications, and software development, 19 
cases), troubled sector (construction and distribution, 26 cases),
20 financial sector (banking, 
insurance, and securities, 25 cases), and other sectors (90 cases), and the differences between 
these sub-samples were statistically tested. 
The CAR estimations summarized in Table 8 reveal that: 
1.  The acquirer benefits from a slight positive stock price effect. 
                                                  
19  Market model estimates -200 to -21 days from the event. Observations are excluded from the sample if the 
length of stock price data is less than 190 days. 
20  Asset prices in the real estate sector were also affected by the bursting of the bubble economy; however, 
there were no mergers between listed firms during the analysis period.   20
2.  A positive stock price effect for targeted firms; is also confirmed, although the effect 
is quite limited. 
3.  The stock price effect described above has been expanding with the increase in M&A 
activity since 1999 (Inoue and Kato 2006, Matsuo and Tamamoto 2006, Higgins and 
Beckman 2006). 
4.  When examined by type of M&A, in the case of equal mergers, both acquirer firm and 
acquired firm benefit from positive stock price effects. Non-rescue mergers have 
significant positive stock effects while rescue mergers have insignificant stock price 
effects (Inoue and Kato 2006). 
＝＝Table 8 about here＝＝ 
Our estimation, Table 9, confirms the results in 1 to 3 above. The stock price effect of 
mergers after 1992 was positive at about 1% with a 3-day window (day -1 to +1) and -0.1% 
with an 11-day window (day -5 to +5) around the announcement day for the acquirer. However, 
if we divide the sample at 1998, mergers after 1999 have significantly higher average CAR. 
Average CAR of acquirer firms was 2.5% (1% significance) with a 3-day event window after 
1999. Hence, after the M&A boom in 1999, the stock market has rewarded acquirer firms with 
higher stock prices. 
＝＝Table 9 about here＝＝ 
On the other hand, the estimated results also show the increased CAR for the target firms 
after the M&A boom. The average CAR of the target firms was 0.7% before 1998, while the 
average CAR of target firms was 4.1% (significant at the 1% level) after 1999, when a series of 
M&A friendly laws were enacted. The results imply that the market began to evaluate the 
synergetic effects of M&A since 1999 as it increased. However, it is also worth noting that a 
recent increase in CAR of the target firms is still lower than international standards. One 
interpretation of this low CAR is that Japanese M&As have little effect on improving 
organizational efficiency. Another interpretation is that the low CAR is a reflection of few 
contests between parties to M&As. At any rate, to identify the causes of low CAR is an 
important future research agenda. 
When examined by sector, troubled sectors like construction and distribution have a 
slightly positive stock price effect compared to the comparison sample. Since the number of   21
merger events is still limited, it is hard to reach any conclusions at this point in time but it is 
reasonable to assume that the stock market will eventually positively evaluate the strategic 
mergers among IT-related firms and the mergers in the sectors troubled by non-performing 
loans that are primarily motivated by a desire to restructure. 
Moreover, that the announcement of the establishment of mega-banks has had a positive 
effect on stock prices has been confirmed in Yamori et al. (2007). When the sample included 
mergers among securities and insurance firms, the same result was achieved. The CAR 
estimated with a 3-day-window for the financial sector is reported to be 4.1% and 4.5% 
respectively for acquirer firms and acquired firms. This result supports the interpretation that 
the consolidation of the financial sector boosts corporate value through synergy or 
management improvements. 
Lastly, Table 8 shows the estimations results of Kruse and Suzuki (2006), who measured 
the market response to hostile takeovers by activist funds, the Murakami Fund (M&A 
Consulting and MCA Asset Management), and Steel Partners Japan. Although such cases are 
still limited thus far, the existing analysis indicates that the market response to such hostile 
TOBs by activist funds has been significantly positive in Japan. 
   
4.3 How is the negative effect of M&A? 
Empire building by M&A   
It is well known that M&As are a double-edged sword in the sense that they can at times 
enhance economic efficiency but may also have negative effects. The natural question to ask is, 
has Japan’s M&A wave since the late 1990s been accompanied by negative effects or not? 
One possibility is that managerial over-confidence (Roll 1986), or lack of effective 
corporate governance might lead to ‘excessive’ mergers by empire building managers. When 
this takes place, the CAR or excess returns of acquirer firms after a merger announcement (the 
deviation of the rate of return of the acquirer firm from the market return, hereafter ER) are 
expected to be negative. However, as the evidence in Table 8 and Table 9 shows, the CAR and 
ER after a merger announcement of the acquirer firms are positive; at least from the M&A 
boom in the late 1990s. These results do not support the argument presented above. 
        On the other hand, if wealth was systematically transferred from shareholders of acquirers   22
to those of the target firms, it is likely that either a large premium and/or large positive CAR 
for target firms would be observed. However, as already noted, M&A activity in Japan 
generates only modest premiums for the target firms (Table 7). Furthermore, the target firms in 
Japan gain only 5% to 6% in CAR, while the U.K.-based and U.S.-based research on M&As 
indicates that target firms gain an average of 20% to 30% CAR. Hence, the evidence presented 
above implies that there is little probability of transfers on a large scale of wealth from 
shareholders of acquirers to shareholders of target firms. 
 
Over-valuation by the stock market 
Next, let’s take a look at possible over-valuations by stock market-driven acquisitions that took 
place in the U.S. during the 1990s.
21 As shown in Figure 2, the stock market in Japan was 
bearish compared to other countries. Hence it is less likely that booming stock prices triggered 
a systematic M&A wave. However, it is possible that higher prices in specific sectors such as 
the bubble in the IT sector promoted M&As. 
    Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) documented that a higher industrial or acquirer’s Tobin’s q 
was associated with the higher probability of M&As. However, this result is consistent not 
only with the understanding that M&As took place in growth industries or firms, but also with 
the fact that M&As were motivated by the over-valuation of the industry or firms in the stock 
market. Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) already made it clear that over-valuation across a 
specific industry is less likely to take place, so that the remaining problem is over-valuation of 
a particular firm. In this regard, Mehrotra and Morck (2006) point out that M&A activity 
which makes use of overvalued stocks has high ER before the merger but is accompanied by 
lower ED after the merger. Table 10 reports the results of the estimated cumulative ER 250 
days after the announcement of the merger and the results of the test of differences before the 
merger. According to Table 10, Panel 1, the average ER after the merger announcement is 
11.8%, which is higher than prior to the merger announcement. This result is even significant 
when we limit the sample to mergers after 1999 when the number of mergers began to 
increase. 
＝＝Insert Table 10 about here＝＝ 
                                                  
21  Shleifer and Vishney (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)   23
Table 10, Panel 2 documents ER around the announcements in different sectors. 
Consistent with the results of CAR, ERs after the announcements in troubled sectors like 
construction and distribution are significantly higher than the pre-announcement ER. The 
mergers in financial sectors do not produce significant differences around the announcements. 
Therefore, it is not likely that the increase in the number of mergers would have been triggered 
by overvalued stock prices. 
However, the IT-related sector shows a -4.8% post-announcement ER, which is 
significantly lower than the pre-announcement ER of 15.4% If we only look at M&As in the 
IT-related sector, it is possible that bidding firms might make use of their overvalued stock to 
conduct M&As with overvalued firms. 
The evidence thus far is mainly related to mergers cases; however, overvalued stock 
prices might also induce excessively frequent acquisitions. Since stock swap acquisitions were 
allowed in 1999, there have been 147 acquisitions using stock swaps through 2004 (65 cases 
took place in 2004). The stock swap acquisitions since 1999 also include the Livedoor case, a 
firm that boosted its stock price through stock splits. The Livedoor incident sounded the alarm 
that firms might be using their overvalued stock to acquire other firms. Among the 147 stock 
swaps acquisitions, 77 acquisitions were conducted by listed firms to privatize affiliated firms 
(RECOF reports). Therefore, the acquisitions that were attempted by firms using overvalued 
stock numbered at most 70. And most of those cases took place among firms that are listed in 
the emerging stock markets. Therefore, even if the acquisitions resulted from over-valuations 
in the stock market, the phenomenon should not characterize the market as a whole. 
        In short, Japan’s M&A wave of the late 1990s was not triggered by overvaluations in the 
stock market. However, against the background of climbing stock prices and low interest rates 
after 2005, it is important to recognize that the Japanese economy has been entering into a 
stage in which excess cash holdings or overvalued stock prices of firms could lead to a stock 
market driven M&A or M&As that simply transfer wealth. 
 
4.4 Possible Transfers of Wealth from M&A 
Exploitation by Rivals and Business Partners 
The increased value from M&As, or the booming stock prices to be specific, might be based   24
on the sacrifices of the acquirer or the target firms’ business partners. Previous research 
addresses this issue by looking at the reactions of the stock prices of rivals and business 
partners to the merger announcements. 
    Analysis of such effects belongs to a future research agenda, though anecdotal facts and 
Table 11 reveal the following points about some simple cases. 
First, Yamori et al. (2007) show that the establishment of mega-banks has had a positive 
stock price effect on other banks and trust banks; however, such stock price effects can not be 
confirmed in local banks. Moreover, the establishment of mega-banks has had positive effects 
on clients especially on clients that are highly dependent on banks. Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) 
examine the stock market reaction to the announcement that Sumitomo and Sakura Bank 
would merge to form Mizuho Bank, and Sanwa, Tokai, and Asahi Bank would become UFJ 
Bank. The announcements that banks would combine to form mega-banks not only has had 
positive stock price effects on the banking sector as a whole but also on the stock prices of the 
banks’ clients. The CAR of clients of the banks are reported to be zero; however, to those firms 
that have high debt ratios, firms that are debt-dependent on their main bank, firms with low 
R&D expenses, firms with no or low credit ratings the news of mergers has had significantly 
positive stock price effects. 
Second, M&As induce the corporate reform of rival firms. A typical case is the effect of 
the recent acquisition by Softbank of Vodafone on KDDI and NTT. Facing the merger of a 
rival, NTT, the former telephone monopoly, launched sweeping corporate reforms including 
reductions in its workforce (Kamino 2007). 
Table 11 summarizes stock price reactions to the major merger announcements. To those 
firms in excessively competitive industries (steel or papermaking), the stock price effects are 
roughly positive. On the other hand, in cases in which rivals expanded in size the stock price 
effects are slightly negative. But, the average reactions from other firms in the same industry 
are positive (1.4% at the 10% significance level). In addition, with limited sample size, the 
consolidation of the steel industry has had negative stock price effects on downstream 
industries. The results imply that M&As in the late 1990s did not trigger large-scale transfers 
of wealth from business partners. 
＝＝Table 11 about here＝＝   25
 
Breach of Trust 
Meanwhile, up until now, M&A activity in Japan has not generated transfer of wealth from 
employees, or led to a breach of trust in hostile takeovers (Shleifer and Summers 1988). 
Hostile takeovers are rare in Japan. After a takeover, there has been no case in which an 
implicit agreement not to lay off employees has not been honored. Of course, in the case of 
mergers for corporate reorganization, there have been employment downsides. Especially, as 
indicated in Kubo and Saito (2007), mergers after 1999 have involved large-scale layoffs. Also, 
Fukao and Amano (2004) find that layoffs occur quickly after mergers between foreign 
corporations. 
In Japanese M&A transactions, even when motivated by the need for restructuring, the 
acquirer pays considerable attention to gaining the consent of the acquired firm with regard to 
layoffs, and foreign firms and funds in Japan have also been careful to seek such consent. 
Hence, layoffs have been conducted in a reasonable manner after mergers. Kubo and Saito 
(2006) examine the wage changes after mergers and find them to be inconsistent with the 
transfer of wealth from employment, per capital wage increases of about 400,000 yen after 
controlling for sales volumes, ROA, and average age of employees.
22 In addition, the job 
training expenses have been maintained after mergers, suggesting that there has been no 
experience loss from the mergers. 
 
5.  Long-term  Performance  Effects 
 
The evidence collected thus far suggests that the stock market reacts to M&A announcements. 
Obviously, there is no guarantee that the market reactions are 100% right or wrong. A positive 
market reaction might be the result not only of an increase in firm value but also of dominant 
market power, or the increasing probability of government rescue (too big to fail). Hence, data 
on long-term performance is needed to determine whether or not M&As boosted corporate 
organizational efficiency. 
                                                  
22  Kubo and Saito (2006) argue that such increase in wages stem from the cutting of new employment, and is 
the result of the weights of the decrease in young and low-productivity employment.   26
However, it is well known that the evidence on the effect of M&As on long-term firm 
performance is in essence ambiguous, and results have been contingent on the performance 
measures and methodology that are applied.
23   Even when we find the performance 
improvements post-merger as compared to pre-merger, it is still very hard to say that this 
improvement is not affected by other factors, because it is almost impossible to disentangle the 
pure effects of M&As from other factors. 
    In addition, to measuring the long-term performance of M&As, we need at least three 
years of post-merger performance data. Hence, there are a few possible empirical studies on 
the long-term performance effects of M&As in Japan. Table 12 tabulates the results of 
research papers since Odagiri and Hase (1989). Table 13 and Table 14 present our own 
estimation results for mergers in 1990-2002 and mergers and acquisitions in the IT sector in 
1996-2002 respectively. 
＝＝  Table 12, 13, and 14 about here＝＝ 
First, there is no study that asserts that M&As have had significant long-term performance 
effects, with the exception of Kruse et al. (2005). However, the case for which Kruse et al. find 
positive effects belongs to the period prior to the bubble economy of the late 1980s, so it is not 
an indication of recent trends in M&As. 
Second, from the results in our own estimation where we select 87 cases from the sample 
of acquired firms with less than 10% of the assets of the acquirer firms,
24 we are not able to 
find any long-term performance effects after mergers since the 1990s. The difference between 
the 3-year-average pre-merger and post-merger performances is zero on average. In addition, 
when we regressed the post-three-year-average performance on the M&A dummy after 
controlling for the 2-year-average pre-merger performance, firm size, and industry dummy, we 
cannot find any long-term performance effects from the results either (Table 13). When 
considering various types of M&As, there is a significant 7% improvement in ROA in the 
related mergers, while there was no significant effect in non-related mergers. Non-group 
mergers improved ROA significantly by 11%, but group mergers did not have any significant 
effect. Both rescue and non-rescue mergers show no significant effects from the mergers. In 
                                                  
23  The results will differ, depending on whether TFP, ROA, or EBITDA, or growth of sales is used in the 
analysis. 
24  Kubo, Miyajima, and Saito (2007)   27
sum, although the cross-M&A-type estimations are roughly consistent with the CAR that is 
reported by Kato and Inoue (2006), the effect of M&As on long-term performance is far more 
robust. 
In the financial sector, it is well known that profitability of the banking sector has been 
improving after the mega-banks were established. Such improvement in profitability is the 
result of the write off of non-performing loans. The estimation results based on the cost 
function in Yamori et al. (2003) show that the cost reduction after M&As has not proceeded as 
scheduled. 
    Table 14 documents the long-term performance of mergers between listed firms in 
1995-2004 within the telecommunications sector in the IT-related industries. Standardized 
capital efficiency (ROA) reported in Table 14 indicates that M&As had negative effects on 
long-term performance after mergers.
25   Controlling for size and leverage, the 
three-year-average ROA after merger is -0.26% while it is -0.35% for acquisitions. This is 
about 10% of the 3.8% average capital efficiency in the same period. 
    Meanwhile, contrary to the CAR analysis, no long-term performance effect has been 
confirmed in the case of hostile block purchases or TOB (Kruse and Suzuki 2005). Recent 
block purchases or TOB by activist funds have attracted attention since 2000. Pressures from 
those funds have exerted financial discipline over management and made management 
recognize the importance of the cost of capital; however, whether or not such pressures lead to 
increased long-term performance is an open question (Kruse and Suzuki 2005). 
    The above evidence can be interpreted in two ways. First, it is plausible that neither the 
expected synergy from M&As nor disciplinary effect of block purchases or TOB have been 
realized yet. This might also apply to the cases of merger between the financial institutions and 
hostile block purchases or TOB and imply the importance of organizational reform after the 
M&A. Another interpretation is that, as Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) emphasized, if M&As 
were motivated by positive and negative economic shocks, and consequently M&As took place 
in specific industries and at specific points in time, then M&As might not necessarily be 
aiming at synergetic effects. In such cases, the post M&A performances have larger variance 
                                                  
25  Untabulated results show that the difference between the standardized earnings ratio one period before and 
three periods after the merger is -0.63%, significant at the 5% level.   28
and show no significant improvement in average capital efficiency. This interpretation would 
be the case for the estimation results in the IT-related industry. 
 The above analysis of the performance effect of mergers is based on capital efficiency. 
Using another performance index such as the sales growth and TFP, the followings points are 
worth noting. First, Nagaoka (2005) shows that when considering post merger growth rates 
equal-mergers have negative effects on sales growth rates while acquisitions interestingly 
boost the growth rates for acquirer and target firms. According to our estimation on IT-related 
industry, sales growth is positively sensitive to the M&A dummy and acquisition dummy, 
although not at a significant level (Table 14, column 3 and 4). M&As as an alternative to 
greenfield investment do not lead to improved capital efficiency but may increase the growth 
rate of acquirer firms. 
    Lastly, when the acquirer firms are foreign, according to the analysis by Fukao et al. 
(2007), the ROA, TFP, and output per employee of target firms are significantly higher than 
those of firms that are acquired by domestic firms. This result implies that the efficiency gains 
after the acquisition are much clearer in the case of acquisitions by foreign firms as compared 
to domestic firms. In other words, the increase in the number of acquisitions by foreign firms 
since the late 1990s has played a significant role in transferring skills and know-how from the 
acquiring firms to the target firms and has boosted efficiency. 
 
 
6. Policy Implications and Conclusion 
 
To sum up, the M&A wave that began in the late 1990s had two major drivers: the pursuit of 
growth strategies and the need for corporate restructuring. While the M&A wave has 
contributed to the structural adjustment of the Japanese economy and to corporate growth, the 
negative aspects of M&As have still not been made visible. I would like to conclude by 
presenting some of the policy implications of my analysis, and to point out some of the 
empirical issues that will need to be addressed in future research. 
. 
6.1. Should M&As Be Promoted? Is the Level of M&A Activity in Japan Still Too Low?   29
While M&As between Japanese corporations have been increasing since 1999, Japanese deals 
account for only a small slice – around 5%-6% – of the global M&A market, a remarkably tiny 
share when compared to Japan’s economic position vis-à-vis the other leading industrialized 
countries. The value of Japanese M&As activity reached 5% of nominal GDP in 2000, a year 
of bank consolidations, and averaged around 2.5% of nominal GDP from 2001-2005 (Table 1), 
so the level of M&A activity is quite low when compared to the U.S., where M&A activity has 
trended at around 10% of nominal GDP (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001, Andrade and Stafford 
2001). And though the number of M&A deals has increased in recent years, acquisitions by 
overseas corporations are still rather infrequent. While cross-border deals accounted for 42% 
of global M&A activity from 1998-2005, such deals accounted for only 13% of all M&A 
activity in Japan. So the question to ask is whether or not the current level of M&A activity in 
Japan is still too low. 
Though M&A activity in Japan may be low compared to the size of its economy, this does 
not necessarily mean that the level of activity is below an appropriate level. The rise of the 
value of corporations involved in M&A can be attributed to the following factors: 1) the 
realization of economies of scale; 2) the transfer of managerial and operational know-how; and 
3) the purchase of sources of competitiveness embodied in human capital and organizations 
including long-term relationships with users (commercial rights), product planning and design, 
the technology for precision manufacturing of parts, strict quality control, and mass production 
at overseas sites. However, whether a corporate acquirer can reap synergies from economies of 
scale and scope through M&As, or whether it can use M&As as a substitute for new 
investment by “purchasing time,” depends on the organizational architectures of the 
corporation, and its approach to technological development. Not all corporations will be able to 
reap benefits from M&As. For example, as shown in chapters of Miyajima (2007), there are 
many industries in which the ability to realize economies of scale will be curtailed. Since there 
is a strong tendency to develop core technologies in-house, and if doing so is in fact the most 
practical approach, it is highly likely that the benefits that accrue by “purchasing time” through 
M&As will be quite limited. Therefore, although M&As in Japan may have an auxiliary 
function of increasing corporate competitiveness, few corporations will be able to pursue 
growth strategies centered on M&As. One may choose to conclude that the scale of M&A   30
activity is too small, but the same point also applies to the number of cross-border deals. In 
short, the benefits that will accrue to a foreign corporation which enters the market would be 
limited to those areas in which it has already possesses a comparative managerial advantage. 
However, even if we take the above points into consideration, there is a possibility certain 
institutional constraints will still prevent M&As from reaching an optimum level. Since not 
only current managements but also the employees of target firms have often been opposed to 
recent M&As, we cannot rule out the possibility that some aspects of Japan’s corporate 
governance structure, which is characterized by a high level of employee involvement, may be 
acting as an impediment to structural adjustments through M&As. Furthermore, bad debts have 
become a severe problem in the construction, real estate, retail, and distribution industries, yet 
many of the very same industries which have a high need for restructuring have seen very little 
M&A activity. It is highly likely that the lack of M&As has delayed the concentration of these 
sectors. The large integrated electrical manufacturers, whose managers and employees have 
been strongly opposed to cross-border deals, are a conspicuous example of deferred 
consolidation. 
Since the banking crisis of 1997, Japanese corporations have divided into two types: 
hybrids which have formed market-based relationships with outside investors, and have 
undertaken an unstinting effort to innovate across various areas including corporate strategy, 
internal organization, the composition of a company’s board of directors, and more 
tradition-bound firms which continue to rely on banks for financing, maintain 
cross-shareholdings, and have for this reason put off reforms of their internal structures 
(Jackson and Miyajima 2007b, Arikawa and Miyajima 2007). The tradition-bound corporations, 
shielded from the discipline of the capital markets, have been slow to implement managerial 
reforms, and their delayed reform means that their value is not highly appraised by capital 
markets. Since the economic recovery began in 2003, there has been a tendency to overlook 
the fact that many Japanese corporations continue to adhere to the conventional model, and 
have not begun to escape the vicious cycle imposed by the features of this model. M&As could 
provide an important opportunity for corporations, which are saddled with problems associated 
with the conventional model to promote managerial reform and to improve their organizational 
efficiencies. Therefore, in order to promote structural adjustment, Japan, in parallel with the   31
reforms of the corporate governance arrangement, needs to address the important challenge of 
building institutional foundations that will allow M&As to take place. 
 
6.2. Increasing Consolidation and Monopoly 
Consolidation of long-established industries such as paper and pulp, steel, shipping, and oil 
refining began in the mid-1990s, and concentration of these industries accelerated after 1999. 
The steel industry agglomerated into two major groups, the shipping industry into three major 
corporations, and the telecommunications industry into three mega-carriers. These horizontal 
mergers and the consolidation of operations of corporations in kindred industries have 
increased the potential for monopolistic control. Against the backdrop of global competition, 
economies of scale have grown more important across a broad spectrum of industries including 
telecommunications, air and sea transport, steel, papermaking, chemicals, and oil refining. 
Given the fact that M&As have unfolded on a global scale in these industries, however, 
the scale of Japan’s top global manufacturers — M&A activity in Japan notwithstanding — has 
not increased in relative terms. Furthermore, although oligopolies are forming around the 
world, and the Japanese steel industry has merged into two major corporate groups, Japanese 
steel manufacturers still wield insufficient bargaining power over price vis-a-vis upstream (iron 
ore) suppliers. While awaiting further more detailed studies, it is my judgment that given the 
integration of domestic and foreign markets in recent years, and the increasing reliance on 
global markets by buyers and consumers, corporations which face competition in international 
markets have few concerns regarding the restraints on competition that might affect M&As. In 
sum, the following three points should be addressed when formulating M&A policy for the 
future. 
First, traditional merger reviews, which focused on post-merger changes in shares of the 
domestic market, are probably unrealistic. In particular, the more a corporation is exposed to 
severe competition in international markets, the more managerial challenges it faces 
developing strategies for international M&As, and the greater its need for clear guidelines on 
consolidation. In this regard, the Fair Trade Commission’s recent adoption of a flexible posture 
on merger restrictions and its clarification of guidelines on international market factors should 
be considered positive trends.   32
Second, though standards for mergers have been relaxed, a policy which promotes M&As 
among domestic corporations while showing less enthusiasm for M&As by foreign 
corporations amounts to an unacceptable double standard. To take a position that emphasizes 
the importance of economies of scale and dynamic competition strongly implies that 
competition should be maintained through the entry by overseas corporations (and the returns 
to scale they could offer). Policies should be adopted which encourage overseas corporations 
to act as acquirers in M&A transactions. 
Finally, whether the rents that accrue through consolidation will be directed toward new 
investment that gives rise to further innovation would depend on the capital markets and the 
effective internal governance of corporations. Therefore, if economies of scale are rapidly 
becoming more important, it will be essential to design appropriate corporate governance 
mechanisms that ensure that the rents that ensue from M&As will be directed toward research 
and development, and plant investment. 
 
6.3. Hostile Takeovers and Takeover Defenses 
Until recently, hostile takeover bids in Japan were linked to campaigns by activist funds to 
alter management policies in order to raise stock prices. In the future, however, hostile 
takeover bids are more likely to be part of a corporation’s attempts to achieve synergies or 
implement growth strategies. Oji Paper’s hostile buyout bid for Hokuetsu Paper in July 2006 
was groundbreaking because it was launched by an ordinary corporation. Given the 
technological development and organizational structures that breed strong corporate cultures of 
Japanese corporations, there may be fewer opportunities to pursue strategic M&A in the form 
of hostile takeovers in Japan compared to the U.S. and Europe. Nevertheless, many Japanese 
companies have begun to formulate M&A policies and search for targets as a means of 
pursuing synergies and implementing growth strategies. Furthermore, the lifting of the ban on 
triangular mergers in May 2007 is expected to increase the potential for mergers by foreign 
corporations. Therefore, one point of contention in the future will be the type of policy stance 
that the government should adopt toward corporate reorganizations and strategic M&A that 
involve hostile takeovers. 
If M&A are expected to play a role in increasing Japan’s economic efficiency, the   33
government’s overall M&A policy should be one that encourages deals that promote corporate 
value, and restrains deals that reduce value. In light of these objectives, the standards for the 
types of takeover defense measures that should be allowed are self-evident. In order to prevent 
surprise takeovers and inadequate defenses on the one hand, and excessive defense measures 
on the other, it is imperative to establish clear and fair rules for takeover buyouts and takeover 
defense measure. In fact, beginning with the release of a report by the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry’s corporate value research committee, various steps have been taken to set 
up rules for takeovers, so the institutional infrastructure for takeovers and takeover defense 
mechanisms is being built. 
As noted in the introduction, the dual nature of M&A complicates the issues surrounding 
hostile takeovers. While some M&A will indeed bring benefits to the shareholders of target 
firms, others will cause harm to the shareholders of the acquiring firm and stakeholders in the 
target firm, and be socially undesirable. The M&A could be motivated by the desire to bestow 
private benefits on the managers of the acquiring firm, or be an attempt by the acquiring firm 
to reap profits by changing the rules of distribution within the target firm. Moreover, the M&A 
could bring about social inefficiencies if the acquiring firm is overvalued or the target firm is 
undervalued by the stock market. If such motivations and outcomes become prevalent in the 
M&A market, there would be a need to promote the adoption of takeover defense policies. 
However, my analysis indicates that there is little likelihood that the M&A market will 
unfold in such a manner. Furthermore, the promotion of takeover defenses would have 
negative repercussions including the encouragement of managerial entrenchment that shields 
corporate managers from the discipline of the stock market. The strengthening of corporate 
governance should reduce the potential for private benefit, and increasing the efficiency of the 
stock market should reduce under- and over-valuations, and thus lower the risk that corporate 
values will be diminished. As M&A have increased in frequency, and the necessary legal and 
institutional infrastructure for M&A deals has been built, the Japanese M&A market has 
entered a stage in which domestic and foreign corporations and funds are beginning to launch 
strategic bids that aim to increase corporate value, so more of these bids can be expected to be 
hostile. And the hostile takeovers bids and takeover defenses that are adopted in response will 
give rise to issues that will require serious attention in coming years.   34
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Figure 1  The Trend of M&A’s among Five Countries 
 
Data includes 1) domestic deals (In-In); 2) deals with foreign buyers and domestic targets (Out-In); and 3) 
deals with domestic buyers and foreign targets (In-Out). Data covers all types of deals ranging from 
















































































Figure 2 Stock price index among five countries 
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Table 1 Numbers of M&A, and M&A Value to GDP ratio. 
 
Note: Data includes 1) domestic deals (In-In); 2) deals with foreign buyers and domestic targets 
(Out-In); and 3) deals with domestic buyers and foreign targets (In-Out). Data covers all types 
of deals ranging from merger, acquisition, and additional purchase. 




Volume of M&A Deals 
Deal Value as percentage to GDP. 
Volume of M&A Deals 
  1991-1997 1998-2005 1991-1997 1998-2005 
U.S.  7,879 8,864  5.4  10.7
U.K.  2,398 3,209  9.1  21.8
Germany  1,479  1,607 1.4 7.5
France  1,207  1,263 3.4 9.9
Japan  253  1,381 0.4 2.5
   40
Table 2 Sectors of M&A 
 
Note: 1) domestic deals (In-In); 2) deals with foreign buyers and domestic targets (Out-In); and 
3) deals with domestic buyers and foreign targets (In-Out). Data on the overall levels and 
industry breakdown (section 2) basically use all types of deals. Source: Jackson and Miyajima 
(2007), with data based on the Thomson ONE Banker database 
 
 
  Japan    Germany   France    U.S.    U.K.   
  1991-2005 Rank 1991-2005 Rank 1991-2005 Rank 1991-2005 Rank 1991-2005 Rank
Banking 30.90%  1  8.70% 3 11.10% 3 9.00%  2  5.10% 5
Communication 14.30%  2  30.80% 1 17.00% 1 15.30%  1  17.60% 1
Chemicals And Allied 
Products   5.50%  3   11.70% 2  12.50% 2  6.90%  4   7.80% 2 
Nondepositary Credit 
Institutions   4.00% 4           2.30%  13           
Transportation 
Equipment   3.90% 5    5.70% 5 4.40% 10                 
Electronic Equipment 
and Components    3.90%  5      5.30% 7  4.40%  6           
Business  Service  3.30% 6    3.40% 7 5.90% 6 8.40% 3    4.40% 6 
Insurance  Carriers   3.20%  7   4.10% 6  7.60% 4  3.70%  8   4.00% 7 
Real  Estate  2.50% 8    4.10% 6 4.70% 9 2.60%  11    3.90% 8 
Food And Kindred 




Computer  Equipment   2.00%  10   1.70% 8         2.90%  9           
Security and 
Commodity Brokers, 
Dealers  1.60%  11    1.20% 11 3.00% 14 2.40%  12    2.00% 11 
Wholesale 
Trade-durable Goods    1.50% 12   1.70% 8                         
Wholesale 
Trade-Nondurable 




Operative  Builders   0.90%  14                                  
Electric, Gas, And 
Sanitary Services            7.10% 4 4.10% 12 4.60% 5    7.80% 2 
Primary Metal 
Industries      1.40% 9                         
Transportation 
Services          1.30% 10                         
Holding And Other 
Investment Offices       1.10% 12 6.20% 5                 
Eating And Drinking 
Places             5.10% 8         2.50% 9 
Printing, Publishing                                   2.20% 10 
Oil and Gas 
Extraction                          4.30%  7    5.60% 4 
Measuring 
Instruments, 
Photographic Good                           2.70%  10           
Total 80.90%     84.00%    91.10%    69.10%     66.80%    
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Table 3 Cross-border M&A Comparisons 
 
Note: 1) domestic deals (In-In); 2) deals with foreign buyers and domestic targets (Out-In); and 
3) deals with domestic buyers and foreign targets (In-Out). Data on the overall levels and 
industry breakdown (section 2) basically use all types of deals. 
Source: Jackson and Miyajima (2007), with data based on the Thomson ONE Banker database 
 
   Volume  of  Deals  Deal Value as percentage to 
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U.S.  1991-1997  6,282   906   631   8.1%  4.6  0.5  0.6 
  1998-2005  7,039   1,215   939   10.2%  9.8  1.3  1.7 
U.K.  1991-1997  870   472   464   25.7%  5.3  2.2  1.8 
  1998-2005  1,937   742   608   18.5%  8.3  8.6  6.3 
Germany  1991-1997  861   215   360   25.1%  0.6  0.5  0.3 
  1998-2005  781   413   406   25.4%  1.9  2.4  3.4 
France  1991-1997  675   223   308   25.5%  1.5  0.8  1 
  1998-2005  613   327   317   25.2%  4.2  4.3  1.3 
Japan  1991-1997  90   131   33   13.0%  0.3  0.1  0 
  1998-2005  1,041   126   89   7.1%  1.7  0.2  0.3   42
Table 4 International Comparison of the Characteristics of M&A Deals 
 
Note: 1) Only listed target firms included. All types of deal included. 2) Merge premium 
estimations include only merger consisting of a 100% acquisition, which is the stock price 
increase ratio 4 weeks before the announcing day. 3) Acquisition Expenses / EBITD (Earnings 
before interests, taxes and depreciation). EBITDA is weighted by percentage of shares 
acquired. 
Source: Jackson and Miyajima (2007), with data based on the Thomson ONE Banker database 
 
 
   Stock Only 
Stock and 
Cash Cash  Only 
Acquisition Expenses / 
EBITDA Ratio   
U.S.  1991-1997 21.8  32.1  46.1  4.02 
 1998-2005  24.4  30.1  45.5  6.80 
U.K.  1991-1997 9.0  33.1  57.9  5.50 
  1998-2005 12.6  31.8  55.6  6.91 
Germany  1991-1997 9.2  15.4  75.4  3.80 
  1998-2005 16.6  15.3  68.1  5.14 
France  1991-1997 14.8  17.1  68.1  4.94 
  1998-2005 12.6  22.3  65.1  5.02 
Japan  1991-1997 20.7  6.7  72.6  0.96 
  1998-2005 29.8  20.3  49.9  1.42 
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Table 5 Types of M&A (1991－2005） 
 
Sample limited to the M&A case where target firms are listed firms. Sample included all types M&A 




  Japan Germany France  U.S.  U.K. 
Merger 12% 7% 8% 45%  45% 
Acquisition 13% 30% 23% 6%  6% 
Partial Acquisition  68% 55% 52% 45%  46% 
Acquisition of Remaining Interest  7% 8% 17% 3%  3% 
Numbers of Deal  2256 1110 2000 13398  2715 
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Table 6 International Comparisons of M&A Markets (1998-2005) 
 
 
Sample limited to the M&A case where target firms are listed firms. Sample included all types M&A 
Source: Jackson and Miyajima (2007), with data based on the Thomson ONE Banker database 
 
 
  Japan Germany France U.S. U.K.
Acquirer stock ownership before M&A  10.8 14.3 26.7  3.6  4.8
Average stock ownership increased by M&A  27 34 33  75  65
Block stakes purchase from third parties  34 18 14  7  8
Weights of private negotiation  50 24 18  17  27
Numbers of average annual tender offer buying 
（2000-2005）  44 13 51 77  120
Weights of TOB between listed firm  12% 11% 41%  13%  43%
Hostile Takeover（1991-2005）  6 6 18 332 176
Sales to the buyers  1 5 12  73  74
Sales to other buyer  0 0 4  103  34
Failed Attempts  5 1 4  156  68
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Table  7  Performance  Deterioration and Weight of M&A 
 
Note: Premium is estimated for the case of a merger and acquisition, partial acquisitions are 
excluded. Premium is estimated by comparing the offered price for four weeks before the 
announcement day. 





Weights of Low PBR(＜1) 
Targets in M&A 
Weights of Earnings 
Decrease Firms in M&A  Merge Premium 
U.S.  1991-1999 25 32  46.6 
  2000-2005 6 10  52.1 
U.K.  1991-1999 7 18  45.1
  2000-2005 8 11  39.9
Germany  1991-1999 2 13  -5.1
  2000-2005 2 10  20.3
France  1991-1999 4 22  47.0 
  2000-2005 8 13  28.2 
Japan  1991-1999 1 5  2.5 
  2000-2005 20 21  10.9 
 
 
   46
Table 8 Results of Event Studies 
 
 










Firms CAR  Source 
Mergers  1977-1984  -3 to +3 154  0.90%  N.A  N.A 
Kang et al.
（2000） 
Mergers  1989-1999  -3 to +3 128  1.62%  119  4.08%  Usui  （2001）
  1990-2001  -1 to +1 137  1.51%  147    4.37 
Mergers  1990-1998  -1 to +1 49  -1.19% 48    1.08 
  1999-2001  -1 to +1 88  3.01%  99    5.97 
Inoue and 
Kato  （2006）
1990-2000  -1 to +1 85  -0.81% N.A 
1990-1998  -1 to +1 69 -1.4%  N.A  Domestic Deals 
(In-In) 
1999-2000  -1 to +1 16 3.2%  N.A 








1977-1998  -1 to +1 -0.56% 1.83   
Merge, Stock 












-1 to +1 N.A  22  3.84   
Hostile Takeover  2000-2004 
+2 
to+200 N.A 22  11.98   
Kurse and 
Suzuki (2005) 
1999-2004  Mega 
Banks   Mergers    Yamori et. al 
(2007) 
Financial Sector 











Sector  1990-2005  -1 to +1 160  1.0%  N.A  Panel 2 
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Table 9 CAR of Bidding Firms around the Announcement of Merger 
 
1. Sample includes merges between firms listed after 1999. Bidding firms takes the value 1 if indicated in 
the RECOF report. 
2. Market model is estimated from -250 days to +20 days from the announcement day. 
3. Missing values in stock price and stock price shorter than 170 days are included from the sample. 
4. Hi-tech sector includes information communication, electric machine, software, and information. 
Problem sector includes construction, real estate, and logistics sections. Note there is no merge event 
from real estate section. Financial sector includes Bank, Securities, and Insurance. Comparison groups 
indicate all other sectors. 
5. *, **, and *** indicate variable significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
Panel 1: Time 







  N 
CAR 
(-1 to +1) 
 
CAR
(-5 to +5) 
 
        
Total 160  1.  5% *  -0.1%   112  3.7%  ***  2.6% ** 
                  
Before 1998  45  -2.8% *** -4.5% *** 28  0.7%    -3.6% * 
After 1999  115  2.5% *** 0.6%   85 4.1%  ***  3.9% ***
Differences   5.3% *** 5.1% ***   3.5%  *  7.5% ***
P value    0.002    0.002      0.059      0.003   
 
Panel 2: Sector 
              







  N 
CAR 
(-1 to +1) 
 
CAR
(-5 to +5) 
 
Comparison 
Sample  90 -0.1% -2.1% ** 71  3.0%  **  2.0% *
Hi-tech Sector  19  1.7%   -0.2%   8  4.6%  *  1.6%  
Differences with 
Comparison Group    1.8% * 1.9% ***   1.6%    -0.4%  
P value    0.078    0.005      0.310      0.437     
Problem Sector  26  1.1%   2.1%   17  2.6%    1.2%  
Differences with   
Comparison Group    1.2%  4.1% **    -0.4%   -0.7%  
P value    0.260    0.023      0.453      0.438     
Financial Sector  25  4.1% **  4.9% **  26  4.5%  **  3.8% ** 
Differences with 
Comparison Group    4.2% * 7.0% **    1.5%    1.8%  
P value    0.073    0.012      0.273       0.234     
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Table 10 Excess Returns around Merger Announcement 
 
1. Sample includes merges between firms listed after 1999. Bidding firms take the value 1 if indicated in 
the RECOF report. 
2. Market model is estimated from -250 days to +20 days from the announcement day. 
3. Missing values in stock price and stock price shorter than 170 days are included from the sample. 
4. Hi-tech sector includes information communication, electric machine, software, and information. 
Problem sector includes construction, real estate, and logistics sections. Note there is no merge event 
from real estate section. Financial sector includes Bank, Securities, and Insurance. Comparison groups 
indicate all other sectors. 
5. *, **, and *** indicate variable significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 





e Days   










Total 175  227.6    10.0% ***  216.8    11.8% ***
           
Before 1998  50  222.7    3.2%   224.4    3.0%  
After 1999  125  229.5    12.8% ***  213.7   15.3% ***
Difference       9.5% *    12.3% * 
P value        0.053      0.075   














nt  P value
 
 175  10.0% *** 11.8% ***  1.8%  0.366   
Comparison 
Sample 97 
11.6% *** 6.8% * -4.8%  0.175   
Hi-tech Sector  20  15.4% *  -4.8%   -20.2%  0.048  ** 
Differences with 
Comparison Group   
3.9%  -11.6%      
P value    0.300    0.108       




-9.7% * 24.5% *     
P value    0.088    0.085       
Financial Sector  26  5.5%   18.9% **  13.4%  0.239   
Differences with 
Comparison Group   
-6.1%  10.9% *     
P value    0.311    0.055       
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Table 11 Stock Market Reaction to the Merge Announcement 
CAR estimated -200 to -21 days from the Announcement Day. Merge of Mitsui Construction includes the Corporate Splits of Fujita Co.  Values of Industrial 
Matched Firms are the average of the other 29 firms. Construction industry price index is excluded. 
 
Announceme
nt Day  Acquirer Firms 








ment  Acquired Firms








        




) CAR(-1,+1)          
1996.2.3 
Ford Motor 











1999.3.27 Renault S.A.  NA 


























Ltd. r  23.9% 
Daishowa Paper 
Manufacturing  4.9% 
Oji Paper 






Co., Ltd.  12.0% 
r 
Oji Paper Co., 
Ltd.  -0.2% 4.8% 
Hokuetsu Paper 




Co., Ltd.  0.2%
Mitsubishi 
Paper Mills 





Corporation  -0.4% -5.7% 
Mitsubishi Oil 




Sekiyu K.K.  4.4%  －  － 
2000.2.17 
General Sekiyu 
K.K.  16.8% 8.3% 
Tonen 




Corporation -5.1% －  －  －  － 
2001.4.14 
Kawasaki Steel 








Ltd.  11.8% 
Kobe Steel, 
Ltd.  12.4% 
 










3%  50 










industry 1.0% －  －  －  － 
2002.12.11 
Nissho Iwai 











Corporation  4.1% 4.5% 
Japan Air System 
Co.,Ltd.  0.2% 
All Nippon 
Airways 
Co., Ltd.  -2.4% －  －  －  － 
2006.3.17 
SoftBank 
Corporation 2.3%  -6.1% 
Vodafone 
K.K(Vodafone 





. 0.5%  －  － 
 Average  9.2%  8.3%  3.1%    1.4%        
 P-value  0.008  0.017  0.094    0.081          51
Table 12 Long-term Estimation of M&A in the Previous Literature 
 
Odagiri and Hase (1989) compare the differences between t-3 to t+3. 
 
mean median 





Firms Target  2 
Method/Ind
icator 

















-3.70% NA  
Odagiri and 
Hase (1989)
TFP -2.70% NA   
Mergers  1970-199
4  84  Estimated 





























    
Nagaoka 
(2005) 






























firms), book value 
of target firm more 
than 1/20 of the 
bidders      
Table 13 - 
Panel 1 
Merge (Listed 
firms), book value 
of target firm more 






Average  -4.3%  
Significantly 
Negative 














Rate -2.10%  
Insignificantly 




Firms       
Acquisition (private 




al.(2007)   52
Table 13 Long-term performance Estimation Result I: Merger of Listed Firms 
(Non-financial firms) 
 
Note: 1. Sample includes 114 mergers between listed firms 1990 - 2001. In which, 87 acquired firms 
are excluded from the sample because the assets of acquired firms are less than 0.1 of the acquirer 
firms. Dependent variable is ROA(t+1,t+2)-ROA(t-1), where ROA is the rate of return of asset. 
Related Merger indicates firms that are categorized in the same two-digit industrial code and 
otherwise. Group indicates dummy that takes value of 1 if acquirer firm holds more than 15% share 
of the target firm. Rescue indicates a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if either the acquirer or 
the acquired firms report ordinary losses in the merger announcement year. Industrial Dummy and 
Year Dummy are included. 
2. *, **, and *** indicate variable significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
  Dependent Variable: ROA(t)-ROA(t-1) 
Independent 
Variable  (1)  (2)   (3)    (4)   
 
Intercept  0.685 *** 0.685 *** 0.685  *** 0.685  *** 
  (0.088)  (0.088)   (0.088)    (0.088)   
ROA(t-1)  -0.180 *** -0.180 *** -0.180    -0.180  *** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)   (0.008)    (0.008)   
Merger t  0.240           




-0.294       




0.400  *      
          (0219)       
Non-group 
Mergers  
    
0.416     
       (0.262)     
Group 
Mergers  
    
0.061     
       (0.294)     
Non Rescue           0.156  
           (0.206)  
Rescue           0.505  
           (0.491)  
2-digit 
Industrial 
Dummy t  Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes 
 
Year 
Dummy t  Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes 
 
Adjusted R
2  0.15  0.15   0.15    0.15   
# of 
Observations  29856  29856   29856    29856 
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Table 14 Long-term performance Estimation Result of M&A II: IT Industry 
 
Note: 1. Sample includes Tokyo Stock Exchange 1st and 2nd section listed Information and 
Communications firms. NROA and GSALE indicates standardized ROA and Sales Growth 
Rate respectively. DA indicates debt ratio and SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
M&A 20 is the dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the asset of target firms has more 
than 1/20 assets of the acquirer firm. Baishu 20 is the dummy variable that takes a value of 
1 if the size of the target firm is larger than 1/20 of the acquirer firm's size. 
2. Performance of Dependent Variable is 3-year average after the merger. Dependent 
Variables include 2-year average before the merger. 




Variable  NROAｔ+  GSALEt+ 
 
  Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient  
Dependent 








C  0.091 *** 0.091  ** 1.697 *** 1.697 *** 
  (6.717)  (6.702)   （20.431）   （20.432）  
NROAｔ- 








  (8.676)  (8.779)   （4.406）   （4.408）  
DA  -0.019 * -0.019 *  0.138 ** 0.138 ** 
  (-1.860)  (-1.862)   （2.246）   （2.264）  
SIZE  -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.063 *** -0.062 *** 
  (-7.988)  (-7.961)   （-8.979）   （-8.976）  
M&A20  -0.027  *     0.053      
  (-1.873)      （0.590）    
Baishu20     -0.034  ***    0.053   
     (-2.354)      （0.590）  
Year dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# of 









2  0.238  0.240  0.154  0.154   
 
 
 
 
 